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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Todd William Carver appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of the first-degree murder of three-year-old 
D.B. 
Statement Of The Facts 
Angela and her two sons, three-year-old D.B. and one-year-old J.W. 
moved in with Carver and his grandmother in mid-January 2011. (Tr., Vol. 3, 
p.691, L.14 - p.692, L.13.) Carver agreed to watch Angela's children while she 
worked. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.694, Ls.6-22.) On March 3, 2011, while Carver was home 
alone with Angela's children, purportedly taking care of them, he called 911 to 
report that he found D.B. on the floor "rigid" and barely breathing. (Tr., Vol. 1, 
p.195, L.23 - p.197, L.12.) Carver claimed he had given D.B. some donuts and 
that D.B. fell off his bed and choked on a donut. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.197, Ls.1-4; Vol. 
2, p.258, L.18 - p.260, L.10.) When law enforcement and emergency medical 
personnel responded, they discovered Carver sitting on the couch inside holding 
D.B. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.253, Ls.4-9; p.308, Ls.5-8.) D.B. was "bluish" and not 
breathing. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.255, Ls.5-12; p.310, Ls.18-20.) D.B. was transported to 
the hospital where he was sent by life-flight to a different hospital at which he 
died the next day. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.323, Ls.2-4.) 
Both the officers on scene and all medical personnel who saw D.B. noted 
numerous bruises all over D.B.'s body. (Tr., Vol. 2, pp.317-319, 339-40, 364-65, 
374-75, 391-93, 444-47.) D.B. had bruises on his face, neck, back, chest, arms, 
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legs, buttocks, penis, and on his foot. (Tr., Vol. 2, pp.391-93, 444-47; Exhibits 1-
22, 39-41.) D.B. had also suffered bilateral subdural hematomas caused by blunt 
force trauma that ultimately resulted in his brain herniating. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.450, 
Ls.9-15, p.453, Ls.4-5; Vol. 3, p.594, L.5 - p.595, L.13, p.622, Ls.18-21.) D.B. 
was pronounced dead on March 4, 2011. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.551, L.14.) 
There was substantial evidence contradicting Carver's claims regarding 
what precipitated his call to 911 on March 3, 2011. Inconsistent with Carver's 
story that D.B. had been eating donuts was the absence of any food in D.B.'s 
mouth or evidence that D. B. had eaten donuts in his bedroom, and the fact that 
Carver's grandmother said Carver was very protective of his sweets and had 
disciplined D.B. in the past for taking his candy. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.311, L.1 - p.312, 
L.6, p.314, L.25 - p.316, L.1, p.412, Ls.5-7, p.414, L.22 - p.415, L.12, p.424, 
L.22 - p.427, L.17.) D.B.'s injuries were also inconsistent with Carver's claim 
that he fell from his bed and Carver was unable to explain the numerous bruises 
all over D.B.'s body. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.622, Ls.23-25.) Although Carver provided a 
few explanations for some of the bruises, his explanations were inadequate to 
explain the extent of D.B.'s injuries. (Tr., Vol. 3, p.610, L.14 - p.614, L.24.) 
Moreover, there was evidence that Carver was abusive toward D.B. and, in 
February 2011, after D.B. began living with Carver, staff at D.B.'s preschool 
reported concerns about abuse to law enforcement. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.187, L.18 -
p.190, L.6; Vol. 2, pp.412-13, 433-35.) 
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The state charged Carver with first-degree murder. (R., pp.12-13, 37-38.) 
At Carver's original pretrial conference, 1 defense counsel noted: "the Court had 
indicated off the record about a week or so ago that mister -- it was aware of a 
letter that Mr. Carver had sent the Court." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.42, Ls.20-23.) The court 
stated it was "told there was a letter" but it did not read it and instead sent copies 
to counsel. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.42, L.24 - p.43, L.2.) Defense counsel advised the 
court "it was Mr. Carver's attempt to essentially file a motion with the Court 
asking for different counsel to be appointed in this case." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, Ls.7-
10.) Specifically, Carver wanted the court to appoint the same attorney to 
represent him in his murder trial that was appointed to represent him on a parole 
violation. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, Ls.12-17.) Defense counsel further informed the 
court that Carver did not believe counsel was "presenting an adequate defense 
or producing adequate evidence." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, Ls.17-21.) When asked if 
that was his opinion, Carver responded, "Yes." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, L.23.) Defense 
counsel represented his disagreement with Carver's position, but admitted he 
and Carver "ha[d] very different views of this case and how it ought to proceed 
and what ought to be done." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.43, L.24 - p.44, L.2.) The court 
advised Carver to file a formal motion and it would "deal with it" or Carver could 
"hire whoever he wants to hire" if he had the ability to do so. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.44, 
Ls.6-11.) In the meantime, the court would not address the issue "without a 
1 Carver's trial was originally set to begin on August 8, 2011, with the pretrial 
conference set for July 26, 2011. (R., p.39.) At the original July 26, 2011 pretrial 
conference, Carver asked the court to reset the trial to September 19, 2001, the 
alternative trial date previously identified as a "second setting." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.39, 
L.20 - p.40, L.16.) The court granted the request. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.41, Ls.6-8.) 
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formal motion ... and giving the State an opportunity to look into it and argue it" 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.44, Ls.11-14.) 
More than one month later, Carver, through counsel, filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Counsel. (R., p.95.) The motion stated it was made at Carver's 
"express direction" and was "for reasons [Carver] [would] articulate on the record 
at the hearing of this motion." (R., p.95.) On September 13, 2011, five days after 
the motion was filed and the date set for hearing on Carver's motion, defense 
counsel submitted an affidavit in support of Carver's Motion to Dismiss Counsel. 
(Ex Pa rte Affidavit of Gregory C. Dickison in Support of the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss Counsel, Filed Under Seal2 ("Affidavit").) In his Affidavit, defense 
counsel stated that, on that same date (September 13, 2011 ), he met with Carver 
at the jail and, during that meeting, Carver "became agitated" and said he did not 
want to discuss his case anymore. (Affidavit, p.1.) Defense counsel averred he 
"continued to make a point" to Carver and Carver "quickly became more 
agitated," "shouted" at defense counsel, and "struck the side of his fist hard on 
the door behind him." (Affidavit, p.1.) Carver also looked at defense counsel in a 
manner that counsel interpreted as a "menacing glare." (Affidavit, p.1.) Carver 
eventually "shouted for jail staff to come get him" and was transported back to his 
cell. (Affidavit, p.1.) While being transported, Carver "continued to make angry 
comments," "yell," and "strike things." (Affidavit, pp.1-2.) Defense counsel 
further averred: 
2 This affidavit was sent to the Idaho Supreme Court as a "Confidential Exhibit" 
after Carver filed an objection to the record in district court seeking its inclusion 
along with the presentence report. (Letter from Kathy M. Ackerman, Clerk, dated 
May 15, 2012 (file folder).) 
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When the defendant made his outburst the defendant and I 
were discussing a fundamental point regarding how the defendant's 
case should proceed. Ongoing disagreement on that fundamental 
point is what I believe is the basis for the defendant's motion to 
dismiss me as his counsel. Although the disagreement has been 
long-standing, I have not before this seen it as rising to the level of 
good cause upon which I could base a motion to withdraw, and 
therefore I continued to work with the defendant in an effort to 
resolve the case. I now believe that the defendant's behavior is 
good cause for me to withdraw or to be dismissed. 
(Affidavit, p.2.) 
Defense counsel explained he believed Carver's behavior constituted 
"good cause" for the appointment of new counsel because counsel "felt 
threatened by [Carver's] conduct" such that counsel "fear[ed] for [his] safety 
should [he] continue to represent" Carver. (Affidavit, p.2.) Based on counsel's 
review of the discovery and his "previous interactions" with Carver, counsel 
expressed a belief that Carver "is fully capable of doing [him] harm" and he "no 
longer [felt] safe meeting with [Carver] unless [Carver] is in a cell" and did not 
"feel safe sitting next to [him] at counsel table unless [Carver] is sufficiently 
shackled." (Affidavit, p.2.) Counsel concluded: 
I believe the defendant was genuinely angry and that he intended 
to make me feel threatened. Regardless of his intent, I did feel 
threatened by his conduct. The defendant's conduct and my fear 
for my safety will be a distraction to me throughout the trial and any 
subsequent proceedings, and I will not be able to impartially and 
zealously represent the defendant or advocate on his behalf. 
I therefore request that the court grant the defendant's 
motion and dismiss me or allow me to withdraw from this case. 
(Affidavit, pp.2-3.) 
The court conducted a hearing on Carver's Motion to Dismiss Counsel at 
which the court inquired of Carver, defense counsel, and the transport deputies 
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involved in Carver's outburst on September 13, 2011. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp.98-114.) 
After considering the information submitted to it, the court denied Carver's Motion 
to Dismiss Counsel {Tr., Vol. 1, p.117, Ls.19-20), but advised: "If something else 
happens between now and Monday we'll look at it" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.122, Ls.24-25). 
No other issue was raised regarding any further disagreement between Carver 
and defense counsel and the case proceeded to trial. 
The jury found Carver guilty of first-degree murder and the court imposed 
a fixed life sentence. (R., pp.146, 153-56.) Carver filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R., pp.158-161.) 
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ISSUES 
Carver states the issue on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it did not conduct an adequate 
inquiry into the conflict of interest identified by defense counsel, and 
when it denied defense counsel's motion to withdraw despite a 
clear conflict of interest? 
2. Did the district court deprive Mr. Carver of his constitutional 
rights to due process and a jury trial when it failed to instruct the 
jury that, before it could find him guilty of felony murder by 
aggravated battery of a child under twelve years of age, it was 
required to find that he had the specific intent to commit the crime 
of aggravated battery and cause great bodily harm to Dominick? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in light of 
mitigating circumstances, including Mr. Carver's relative youth, and 
its incorrect conclusion that aggravating factors were present, it 
imposed a fixed life sentence following his conviction for felony 
murder? 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Carver failed to establish either that the district court's inquiry into the 
alleged conflict was inadequate or that the court erred in declining to appoint 
substitute counsel? 
2. Has Carver failed to show that the elements instructions, which comport 
with established law, resulted in error, much less fundamental error? 
3. Has Carver failed to show that imposition of a fixed life sentence for the 
beating death of a three-year-old boy is unreasonable under any view of the 
facts? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Carver Has Failed to Establish That The District Court's Inquiry Into The Alleged 
Conflict Of Interest Was Inadequate Or That The Court Erred In Failing To 
Appoint Substitute Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Carver asserts "the district court erred when it did not conduct an 
adequate inquiry into the conflict of interest identified by defense counsel, and 
when it denied defense counsel's motion to withdraw from the case due to his 
conflict of interest." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Application of the relevant legal 
standards to the facts shows the court's inquiry was adequate and the court did 
not err in declining to appoint substitute counsel. Carver has failed to establish 
otherwise. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon 
a showing of good cause; such decision lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009) 
(citing State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715, 52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002)). 
"Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of 
discretion." ,U;l An abuse of discretion will only be found if the denial of such a 
motion results in the abridgment of the accused's right to counsel. kl 
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The adequacy of a court's inquiry into an alleged conflict of interest is a 
constitutional issue over which this Court exercises free review. Severson, 147 
Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 424 (citation omitted). 
C. The Court Conducted An Adequate Inquiry Into The Alleged Conflict 
1. The Alleged Conflict And The Court's Inquiry 
As Carver notes, there were two grounds offered in support of his Motion 
to Dismiss Counsel and counsel's related request to withdraw. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.12.) Carver wanted counsel dismissed because he did not believe counsel 
was adequately representing him. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.99, L.15 - p.101, L.9.) In his 
Affidavit, counsel argued dismissal or withdrawal was appropriate because his 
relationship with Carver had deteriorated to the point that he felt fearful of Carver. 
(Affidavit.) On appeal, Carver only challenges the court's actions in relation to 
counsel's asserted basis for the appointment of substitute counsel. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.12.) 
With respect to counsel's Affidavit that was filed the same day of the 
hearing, the court noted it had not yet reviewed the Affidavit and asked counsel 
whether it was "in support of Mr. Carver's motion for substitute counsel, or ... in 
support of a motion to withdraw[.]" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.102, Ls.15-19.) Counsel stated 
it was "more in the nature of a support -- in support of a motion to withdraw" and 
acknowledged the Affidavit was not provided to the state because it was his 
opinion that it would "compromise Mr. Carver's position with the State." (Tr., Vol. 
1, p.102, Ls.20-25.) Although the court did not review the Affidavit prior to the 
hearing, it is apparent from the court's questions at the hearing that it was 
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reviewing the Affidavit during the course of the hearing. 3 (See, ~' Tr., Vol. 1, 
p.104, Ls.10-11 (court inquires whether either of the officers present were the 
ones that removed Carver from the attorney visiting room).) 
Regarding the allegations in the Affidavit, the court inquired of the 
deputies currently in the courtroom about what they observed in terms of 
Carver's behavior after his meeting with counsel that morning. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.104, 
Ls.16-20.) The deputies confirmed that Carver was angry and hit walls, but the 
only word they heard him say was, "enough." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.104, L.20 - p.105, 
L.21.) When asked whether they heard Carver make any comments they "would 
consider to be a threat toward [defense counsel]," only one deputy responded, 
stating: "He was definitely angry when he left. But I don't -- nothing verbally 
except for enough." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.106, L.22 - p.107, L.3.) 
After hearing from the deputies, the court advised Carver that, while 
certain decisions were within his sole control, such as whether to proceed to trial 
and whether to testify, the presentation of evidence and trial strategy were 
ultimately counsel's decisions. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.107, L.4 - p.108, L.19.) The court 
then engaged in the following exchange with Carver. 
THE COURT: I am concerned that -- and I've had clients who are 
angry at me, too. It comes with the job. But is this a situation 
where, I mean, you're just trying to get another attorney who's 
going to turn around and tell you the same thing that Mr. Dickison is 
and you're going to be mad at them? 
[CARVER]: No. I believe that they would actually put in a little more 
effort. I don't feel he's doing anything. He's not even trying to 
defend me. He's basically agreeing with everything the prosecutor 
3 To the extent Carver attempts to imply otherwise (see, ~. Appellant's Brief, 
p.9), the implication is not supported by the record. 
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said. I haven't heard one thing on his own behalf that supports me 
pretty much. It's all, well [the prosecutor] said this. We're going off 
this. Well, I think this, too. So basically like he's a prosecutor 
prosecuting me as well. 
THE COURT: I understand that's your point of view. That's not 
necessarily Mr. Dickison's point of view because that's not what he 
gets paid to do. He's not a prosecutor. But I am concerned about 
the outbursts, something to the words of enough, in other words, 
does that mean that you're not talking to Mr. Dickison and refuse to 
talk to him about anything? 
[CARVER]: Yep. 
THE COURT: You understand, obviously, if we go to trial next 
Monday and you're not talking to your attorney it's not going to be 
any good. 
[CARVER]: Yeah. Well, this morning's thing was more of I tried to 
end it. He wouldn't allow me to end it. So I ended it myself. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, you need to understand that the only 
person that can relieve Mr. Dickison from his representation is me. 
[CARVER]: Yeah. 
THE COURT: You don't get to fire him, and he doesn't get to 
withdraw or quit without my permission, and it has to be for good 
cause. I'm not sure I'm seeing good cause yet. You can represent 
yourself, if you want to, and Mr. Dickison can act as stand-by 
counsel. There's a lot of potential dangers with doing that. Of 
course, you always have the right to hire your own attorney if you 
had some sort of family help or funds to do that. Is that going to 
happen? 
[CARVER]: I don't have the funds to be able to hire one for this. 
THE COURT: Your family is not going to help you there? 
[CARVER]: Can't afford it. 
THE COURT: You want to represent yourself? 
[CARVER]: I do not want to represent myself. 
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THE COURT: Your actions, this morning, the words that you said, 
hitting the wall or whatever you did, what was the purpose of all 
that? 
[CARVER]: I just had enough. It seems like every time he comes 
and visits me it's the same thing. We start arguing over and over 
about the same thing. I'm not going to plead guilty to something I 
didn't do even if it is a lesser crime. I don't care how far down it 
goes I'm not going to admit any guilt to something I did not do. 
THE COURT: ... If you're not guilty you should plead not guilty. 
So if we proceed on Monday with a not guilty plea how do you see 
your being able to work with Mr. Dickison? 
[CARVER]: I guess if that's what has to be, but as far as I know 
told [sic] there's nothing presented in my behalf because I don't 
have a defense. I thought that's what a defense attorney was for. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.108, L.19-p.111, L.20.) 
The court explained that defense attorneys can present a defense without 
calling witnesses, reminded Carver it was his decision whether to testify, and 
asked defense counsel what witnesses he intended to call. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.111, 
L.25 - p.112, L.16.) Defense counsel declined to respond, stating he was "not 
comfortable disclosing that information" but noted he had disclosed potential 
witnesses to the state. (Tr., Vol.1, p.112, Ls.17-18, p.113, Ls.13-25.) 
The court then directly asked Carver whether it was his intent to threaten 
defense counsel that morning. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.114, Ls.1-3.) Carver responded: 
"At that moment, yes." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.114, L.4.) The court inquired whether it was 
intended as a physical threat, and Carver said, "Not physically, no." (Tr., Vol. 1, 
p.114, Ls.5-6.) The court next asked defense counsel whether he wanted to be 
"heard on [his] motion to withdraw any further[.]" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.114, Ls.7-8.) 
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Counsel responded: "No, Your Honor. I have nothing further to add." (Tr., Vol. 
1, p.114, Ls.9-10.) 
After hearing the state's position on the issue, which was that current 
counsel should remain because it appeared Carver was just frustrated (Tr., Vol. 
1, p.114, L.20 - p.116, L.22), the court asked defense counsel: "[D]o you feel 
that you can and would be prepared for trial on Monday?" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.116, 
Ls.23-24). Counsel answered, "Yes." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.116, L.25.) The court 
followed-up: 
THE COURT: Even if Mr. Carver chooses not to -- cooperate is the 
wrong word, but anyway not to communicate with you in any way, 
shape or form between now and then? 
MR. DICKISON: I would still be prepared to proceed to trial on 
Monday. It would hamper things. 
THE COURT: Obviously, yeah. Mr. Carver, if Mr. Dickison is not 
permitted to withdraw and if we go to trial on Monday what's your 
position? Are you just going to withdraw inside yourself and not 
communicate with Mr. Dickison, or are you going to try and 
continue to try and talk to him, work with him. 
[CARVER]: I guess I'll try to continue to work with him because 
apparently everything is out of my control. 
THE COURT: Three things are not out of your control4. Everything 
else is -- seems like it's out of your control, put it that way, but 
obviously you have some input. The motion to withdraw will be 
denied at this point. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.1-20.) 
4 The three things the court was referring to related back to his earlier discussion 
with Carver regarding the decisions Carver had complete control of - how to 
plead, whether to have a jury trial, and whether to testify. (See Tr., Vol. 1, p.107, 
Ls.6-12.) 
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2. The Court Conducted An Adequate Inquiry Into The Alleged 
Conflict And Carver Has Failed To Establish Error In The Court's 
Decision Not To Appoint Substitute Counsel 
The state and federal constitutions guarantee an indigent defendant the 
right to court-appointed, conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 
271 (1981); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). When 
a trial court has reason to believe a conflict exists, the court has a duty to inquire 
about the conflict. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980); Severson, 147 
Idaho at 703, 215 P.3d at 423. "A trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry, under 
certain circumstances, will serve as a basis for reversing a defendant's 
conviction." Severson, 147 Idaho at 703, 215 P.3d at 423. "[O]nce a defendant 
raises a timely objection to a conflict, the trial court is constitutionally obligated to 
determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists." !Q.,_ (citations omitted). "A 
court's failure to make a proper inquiry after a defendant's timely objection will 
result in the automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction." Id. 
In addressing what constitutes an adequate inquiry, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has stated: "The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the 
defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern." Severson, 147 Idaho at 704, 
215 P.3d at 424 (citation and quotations omitted). "[l]n determining whether a 
conflict exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on representations made by 
counsel." !Q.,_ (citation omitted). "A court may inquire further into facts, but is 
under no original or continuing obligation to do so." !Q.,_ (citation and quotations 
omitted). 
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As detailed above, the court in this case held a hearing on the motion, 
considered information from deputies who were aware of the situation, and 
allowed both Carver and counsel to address the potential conflict. This inquiry 
into the information contained within counsel's Affidavit was more than adequate. 
See Severson, 147 Idaho at 705, 215 P.3d at 425. Carver's contention otherwise 
lacks merit. 
Carver argues the court's inquiry was inadequate because the court "did 
not inquire into defense counsel's ability to provide competent and diligent 
representation (which is different than simply being ready to participate at trial on 
a given date)," and "did not inquire as to whether Mr. Carver had provided written 
consent for defense counsel to continue representing him despite the conflict of 
interest." (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.) According to Carver, both inquiries were 
required by l.R.P.C. 1.7. Carver's reliance on l.R.P.C. 1.7 is misplaced. The 
analytical framework applicable to Carver's conflict claim is the Sixth 
Amendment, not l.R.P.C. 1.7. While Rule 1.7's prohibition against concurrent 
conflicts of interest may embody certain constitutional principles when applied to 
criminal cases, it does not define the Sixth Amendment, nor does the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers' Ethics Advisory Committee's ("NACOL 
Committee") interpretation of ABA's similar Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.7. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) Carver's own argument reveals why his 
reliance on l.R.P.C. 1.7 would be inappropriate in addressing whether he was 
afforded the conflict-free counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
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According to Carver, the court's inquiry into the conflict was inadequate 
because the court did not "satisfy" "two of the four requirements that must be 
satisfied to qualify for an exception" under l.R.P.C. 1.7. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) 
Specifically, Carver notes the court did not ascertain whether defense counsel 
believed he would be able to "provide competent and diligent representation to" 
Carver, I.RP .C. 1.7(b)(1 ), or get "informed consent" from Carver "in writing," 
LR.P.C. 1.7(b)(4). (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Exactly how Carver could 
constitutionally consent to counsel's alleged conflict in this case is a mystery. If 
counsel, in fact, could not diligently represent Carver within the meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment as a result of any fear of Carver, the correct response under 
the Sixth Amendment would be to appoint substitute counsel, not to have Carver 
give "informed consent" to be represented by counsel. Carver's claim that the 
court's inquiry was inadequate for failing to "satisfy" the criteria under l.R.P.C. 
1.7(b) fails as no such inquiry was appropriate, much less required. 
Although the state submits l.R.P.C. 1.7(b) does not govern the analysis, 
the state concedes a court should inquire as to whether counsel is capable of 
representing a defendant when counsel has indicated that he cannot do so due 
to his fear of the defendant. However, the court satisfied that obligation in this 
case. After hearing the representations from the deputies that Carver did not 
actually threaten defense counsel, allowing Carver to voice his concerns, and 
clarifying that Carver did not intend any of his comments or actions as a physical 
threat, the court asked defense counsel if he had anything to add. Counsel said 
he did not and subsequently advised the court that he felt he could and would be 
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prepared to proceed to trial. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.114, Ls.7-10, p.116, Ls.23-25.) That 
Carver chooses to interpret counsel's responses as insufficient to show any sort 
of retraction from the position stated in the Affidavit does not mean that defense 
counsel did not determine, based on Carver's comments and demeanor at that 
hearing, that he could zealously represent Carver at trial despite the earlier 
interaction. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) And it certainly does not mean the court's 
inquiry was inadequate because the court did not ask the precise questions 
Carver claims on appeal should have been asked. See Severson, 147 Idaho at 
704, 215 P.3d at 424 ("Although the court did not ask the specific questions 
[Carver] now claims were necessary, [Carver] was given the opportunity to draw 
the trial court's attention to his specific concerns, but failed to do so."). 
"Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict 
actually exists." Severson, 147 Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 424 (citation omitted). 
Carver, quoting the NACOL Committee's interpretation of ABA Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1. 7, asserts "a threat of bodily harm by a client against a 
lawyer creates a personal conflict of interest." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Carver's 
reliance on this principle, even if relevant to the Court's analysis, is unwarranted 
because there is no evidence that Carver threatened defense counsel with bodily 
harm. Indeed, the evidence establishes the opposite. Thus, there was no 
conflict based on a threat of bodily harm. 
The fact that defense counsel felt threatened at the conclusion of his 
meeting with Carver on September 13, 2011, also does not necessarily result in 
a conflict that required the court to appoint substitute counsel; at best it triggers 
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an inquiry by the court, which is precisely what happened. As noted, the court's 
inquiry included asking defense counsel for further input and if he could and 
would be prepared for trial. At no time during the hearing on the motion did 
counsel state that, despite the information presented to the court, he remained 
too fearful to represent Carver. Defense counsel is not a potted plant; if he 
believed his concerns regarding his safety were not adequately addressed or 
alleviated at the hearing, he could have said as much. Instead, he told the court 
he was prepared to represent Carver at trial and he never expressed any 
subsequent concern despite the court's invitation that he could do so. 5 (Tr., Vol. 
1, p.122, Ls.24-25.) 
Because Carver has failed to establish that the district court did not satisfy 
its duty of inquiry, he has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to reversal of his 
conviction on this basis, and he has otherwise failed to show error in the court's 
decision not to appoint substitute counsel. 
5 Carver also argues that defense counsel demonstrated in his Affidavit that his 
"personal interests controlled over those of his client when he asserted that he 
would not feel comfortable appearing in court with Mr. Carver unless he was 
'sufficiently shackled."' (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Carver further argues, "No 
defense attorney acting in his client's interests would request that a trial court 
shackle his client during trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) While counsel did 
indicate in his Affidavit that he would not "feel safe" unless Carver was 
"sufficiently shackled" (Affidavit, p.2), he never actually asked the court to have 
Carver restrained either at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss Counsel 
conducted on September 13, 2011, or at the hearing held on September 15, 
2011, when the court, on its own, stated Carver would have "ankle chains," which 
was "normal[ ]." but no "belly chains." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.142, Ls.12-13.) The court 
also noted a requirement that there be an officer present "when a person is 
incarcerated," and directed the officers where to sit. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.142, Ls.20-
23.) Notably, counsel did not, at any point during this discussion, mention the 
need for additional or different security measures due to any ongoing fear he was 
experiencing. 
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II. 
Carver Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Elements Instruction 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Carver argues that the district court erred by 
failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of first-degree murder. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-26.) Carver has failed to establish the elements 
instruction resulted in fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261 
P.3d 853, 864 (2011 ). "An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible 
error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
C. Carver Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Establishing Fundamental 
Error With Respect To The Elements Instruction 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). This same 
principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See l.C.R. 30(b) ("No party 
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 
instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection."). Absent 
a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged 
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error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Carver to 
demonstrate that each error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this three-
prong test to Carver's claim of instructional error shows that Carver has failed to 
meet his burden. 
Pursuant to l.C. § 18-4003(d), the state charged Carver with first-degree 
murder "committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate the crime of 
Aggravated Battery, on a child under twelve (12) years of age." (R., p.37.) With 
respect to this charge, the jury received the following instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder 
in the perpetration of an aggravated battery upon a child under 
twelve (12) years of age, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about March 3, 2011, 
2. in the state of Idaho[,) 
3. Todd William Carver committed an aggravated battery 
upon [D.B.,] 
4. Which caused [D.B.] great bodily harm, 
5. From which bodily harm [D.B.] died, and 
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6. That [D.B.], at the time of his death, was under twelve 
(12) years of age. 
To prove Todd William Carver guilty of first degree murder in 
this way, the state does not have to prove that the defendant 
intended to kill [D.S.], but the state must prove that during the 
perpetration of an aggravated battery on a child under twelve (12) 
years of age, the defendant killed [D.S.]. 
If you find that the state has failed to prove any of the above, 
you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder. If you 
find that all of the above have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of first degree 
murder. 
(R., p.190 (bold and capitalization original).) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
An "aggravated battery" is a "battery" that causes great 
bodily harm, 
A "battery" is committed when a person: 
(1) willfuly [sic] and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the 
person of another; or 
(2) actually, intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another 
person against the will of the other; or 
(3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. 
An act is "willful" or done "willfully" when done on purpose. 
One can act willfully without intending to violate the law, without 
intending to injure another or without intending to acquire any 
advantage. 
(R., p.191 (bold and capitalization original).) 
Carver concedes he did not object to the elements instructions, which 
accurately reflect the pattern jury instructions,6 but contends he is entitled to relief 
6 Compare ICJI 704C ("felony murder"), 1203 (battery defined), 1207 (aggravated 
battery). 
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under the fundamental error doctrine because, he argues, the instructions 
"omitted an essential element of the crime for which he was charged." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.16, 23.) Specifically, Carver claims that, in order to convict 
him of first-degree murder, the jury had to find he "had the requisite mental state 
to commit an aggravated battery" and find "that he had the specific intent to 
cause great bodily harm to [D.B.]." (Appellant's Brief, p.20 (emphasis omitted).) 
Carver further asserts the jury was instead "specifically told that it did not have to 
find that [he] had any intent to commit a murder, commit aggravated battery, or 
cause physical harm to [D.B.] in order to find [him] guilty of first degree murder." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Carver has failed to show any error, much less 
fundamental error, that would entitle him to relief. 
Idaho law is clear that, in order to prove a defendant is guilty of first-
degree murder resulting from the perpetration of an aggravated battery on a child 
under 12, '"the state does not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill," 
but only has to prove "that during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate" the 
aggravated battery, the victim died. (ICJI 704C and comments.) Instruction No. 
4 accurately restates IC.JI 704C and the state's burden of proof. As such, it was 
not error to give the instruction. See McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 
225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010) ("The l.C.J.1. are presumptively correct. Trial 
courts should follow the l.C.J.I. as closely as possible to avoid create 
unnecessary grounds for appeal."). 
Instruction No. 5 also incorporates the relevant l.C.J.I, and is an accurate 
statement of the law as explained in State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 493-95, 259 
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P.3d 629, 639-41 (Ct. App. 2011 ), review denied, and State v. Carlson, 134 
Idaho 389, 3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000). That Carver disagrees with the holdings in 
Grove and Carlson falls far short of establishing fundamental error. Quite the 
contrary, that the district court followed the law and that defense counsel did not 
object to the court doing so show there was no error and certainly no plain error. 
Indeed, Carver's disagreement with established precedent is "irrelevant in the 
context of fundamental error where the error must be plain under current law." 
Grove, 151 Idaho at 494, 259 P.3d at 640 (emphasis original). 
Carver's claim of instructional error, raised for the first time on appeal, 
fails. 
111. 
Carver Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Imposing A Fixed Life Sentence For The First-Degree Murder Of Three-Year-Old 
D.B. 
A. Introduction 
Carver argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing a fixed 
life sentence, asserting the court "failed to give sufficient consideration to the 
mitigating factors present in this case" and erroneously "concluded that 
aggravating factors were present when they were not." (Appellant's Brief, p.27.) 
Carver's arguments lack merit. Application of well-established sentencing 
standards to the facts presented to the district court reveals Carver has failed to 
meet his heavy burden of establishing the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion." 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ." kl 
C. Carver Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Imposing Sentence 
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise 
of discretion are well established. Where, a sentence is within statutory limits, 
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011); 
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). To carry this 
burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable 
view of the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 (citations omitted). 
A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kl at 875-76, 253 P.3d at 312-13; State 
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001). 
First-degree murder is punishable by a maximum allowable sentence of 
fixed life imprisonment. l.C. § 18-4004. Because the fixed life sentence imposed 
upon Carver's conviction is within the statutory limit, Carver bears the burden on 
appeal of showing that his sentence is excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 
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598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). On appeal, the question before this 
Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but rather, whether the district 
court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 
217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 
710 (Ct. App. 1982)); see also Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 
("[W]here reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested in the trial court 
will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial court with 
its own."). Although Carver's sentence is unquestionably weighty, he has not 
demonstrated from the record any abuse of discretion in the district court's 
determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was not only warranted, but 
also necessary, under the facts of this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "To impose a fixed life sentence 
requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely 
released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that the 
individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 
P.3d at 313 (citing Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149, 191 P.3d at 227; State v. Cross, 
132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227, 232 (1999)) (internal quotations and 
emphasis omitted); accord State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 388, 179 P.3d 346, 
351 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 638, 759 P.2d 926, 
929 (Ct. App. 1988)) (a fixed life sentence "should be regarded as a sentence 
requiring a 1·1igh degree of certainty - certainty that the nature of the crime 
demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the 
perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released."). This "high 
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degree of certainty" is generally satisfied where "the offense is so egregious that 
it demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if 
the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death 
is the only feasible means of protecting society." Perez, 145 Idaho at 388, 179 
P.3d at 351 (emphasis added). The record clearly shows the existence of both of 
these circumstances in this case. 
In imposing sentence on Carver, the district court considered all of the 
information before it, including the presentence report, prior rehabilitative efforts, 
Carver's age, history of drug use, treatment of D.B. and lack of emotion toward 
D.B.'s condition and ultimate death, and the arguments of counsel. (R., pp.153-
155.) The court also considered the objectives of sentencing and concluded the 
nature of the offense and Carver's history, which indicates he is not amenable to 
rehabilitative efforts, warranted a fixed life sentence. (R., pp.155-156; Tr., Vol. 4, 
p.810, L.13- p.813, L.4.) 
Carver claims the court abused its discretion in imposing a fixed life 
sentence, asserting the court "failed to give sufficient consideration to the 
mitigating factors present in his case, including [his] relative youth, and when it 
concluded that aggravating factors were present when they were not." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.27.) With respect to mitigating factors, Carver specifically 
identifies his "relative youth" and claims this was the "most obviously-ignored 
mitigating factor." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) This assertion is contradicted by the 
record. Not only did defense counsel specifically emphasize Carver's age in 
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presenting argument at sentencing (Tr., Vol. 4, p.806, Ls.11-22), the district court 
specifically noted Carver's age as a consideration (R., p.153). 
Carver's related claim that, because of his age, he should be given "the 
chance to benefit from the rehabilitative programs available in prison" and allow 
the parole board, in its "discretion" to decide whether he should "return to society 
some day" does not establish an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's Brief, p.32; 
see also p.35 (claiming his fixed life sentence is "blatantly excessive" and "he 
should be afforded the opportunity, at some point, to present evidence to the 
parole board that he is no longer a risk to the community" and the "parole board 
could then consider this evidence, and exercise its discretion, before giving him 
the opportunity, when he is ready, to return to the community"). In Windom, the 
Idaho Supreme Court rejected the "view that the potential future action of parole 
authorities ought to be considered in the analysis of the propriety of a fixed life 
sentence imposed in the exercise of judicial discretion," noting the "Legislature 
has conferred the power and responsibility to impose determinate sentences 
upon the judiciary, including determinate life sentences." Windom, 150 Idaho at 
878 n.1, 253 P.3d at 315 n.1. 
The Court in Windom also explained the necessity of affording deference 
to a district court's view of a defendant's rehabilitative potential: 
The task of sentencing is a difficult one. When evaluating 
the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, trial judges are asked 
to make a probabilistic determination of a human being's likely 
future behavior. The reality is that a sentencing judge will never 
possess sufficient information about the defendant's character, life 
circumstances and past behavior so as to project future behavior 
with unerring accuracy. To the contrary, the factual determination 
of the defendant's probability of re-offense will always be based on 
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limited data. This extraordinarily difficult task is made more difficult 
because it is merely one factor to be considered by the sentencing 
judge - and a subordinate consideration at that. State v. Moore, 78 
Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (19856) ("Rehabilitation is not 
the controlling consideration.... The primary consideration is, and 
presumptively always will be, the good order and protection of 
society."). 
Sentencing is less a science than an art. Judges face a 
different uncertainty principle than physicists: they must make a 
factual finding of the probability of future criminal behavior based 
upon limited data. In so doing, they draw upon their accumulated 
experience. It is precisely because of the difficulty of fashioning an 
objectively appropriate sentence that this Court has adopted a 
deferential standard of review of sentencing decisions. 
Windom, 150 Idaho at 879, 253 P.3d at 316. 
Based on the data available to the district court regarding failed 
rehabilitative opportunities afforded to Carver, it was well within the court's 
discretion to conclude Carver lacked rehabilitative potential given Carver's 
abysmal record in this regard. That the district court did not accept, as Carver 
wanted him to, that his age necessarily meant he could be rehabilitated and he 
should therefore be sentenced to a term less than fixed life, does not establish an 
abuse of discretion, particularly given the absence of any evidence establishing 
Carver could be rehabilitated. 7 
7 Carver's self-serving assertion to the presentence investigator that "he 
understands his behavior was inappropriate" with respect to his prior "disciplinary 
write-ups" while in the juvenile corrections system "and now [he] handles things 
differently" (PSI, p.15) does not, as Carver claims on appeal, "reveal[] that [he] 
is capable of improving his character and growing into a person worthy of the 
opportunity to return to society at some point" (Appellant's Brief, p.34). Indeed, 
nothing about Carver's actions since he was paroled on December 22, 2010, less 
than three months prior to D.B.'s murder, supports a claim that he has any idea 
how to behave or "handle things" appropriately. 
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Carver also relies on United States Supreme Court Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence in juvenile cases in support of his claim that his age demands a 
lesser sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.29-34 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 
2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010); and Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005)). Such reliance is misplaced not only because Carver was 
not a juvenile at the time of the offense and the offense he committed was 
murder, but also because the Court in Windom specifically stated it is "neither 
necessary nor appropriate to confuse our well-established standard of review of 
a trial court's sentencing decision by selective application of statements found in 
decisions [like Graham and Roper that] defin[e] the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment protections." 150 Idaho at 880 n.2, 253 P.3d at 317 n.2. 8 
Applying the correct, and deferential legal standard set forth in Windom, 
Carver has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in concluding 
that "in order to protect society the defendant must be incarcerated without 
parole." (R.,p.156.) 
The egregious nature of the offense also supports a fixed life sentence. 
Windom, 150 Idaho at 880, 253 P.3d at 317. As noted by the district court, "The 
crime was horrific in that it was committed against a defenseless 3 year old child 
and the punishment should fit the crime." (R., p.155.) The evidence presented 
at trial supports this finding. The photographs introduced at trial showed a small 
child covered in bruises. The pain Carver undoubtedly inflicted on D.B. before he 
8 Curiously, Carver never cites the Supreme Court's opinion in Windom in his 
brief, but instead relies on the 1988 Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Eubank, 
114 Idaho 635, 759 P.2d 926 (Ct. App. 1988), for the standard for review of fixed 
life sentences. (Appellant's Brief, p.31.) 
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ultimately killed him is incomprehensible. Carver has failed to establish the 
district court abused its discretion by concluding this offense warrants a fixed life 
sentence. 
As for Carver's claim that the district court relied on aggravating factors 
that were not present, it appears this assertion is based on the court's dim view 
of Carver's rehabilitative potential and his "purported lack of emotion." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.35.) As noted, the district court was not required to share 
Carver's view of his prospects for rehabilitation and the fact that the court did not 
share those views does not mean the factor was "not present." With respect to 
Carver's lack of emotion, the court noted: 
From the moment the police arrived at the defendant's residence in 
response to a 911 call and found the 3 year old victim not breathing 
and without a heart beat the defendant has not shown any concern 
or emotion for the little boy or the boy's family. It would be normal 
for a person, even if he continues to maintain his innocence, to feel 
sorry that the boy died and feel sorry for the boy's family. Mr. 
Carver has not shown any such empathy or concern. Mr. Carver 
was at the hospital in Grangeville and Spokane, Washington when 
medical personnel were trying to save the little boy, but Mr. Carver 
never displayed any concern for the boy or his condition. 
(R., p.155.) 
Carver asserts that he "has not made a public spectacle of emotion is not 
indicative of whether he felt grief about [D.B.'s] death." (Appellant's Brief, p.35.) 
Carver also argues that because D.B.'s mother also failed to "display[ ] her 
emotions ... reveals that there is nothing particularly significant about [his own] 
lack of a public emotional display." (Appellant's Brief, p.35 and n.16.) Carver 
also tries to claim that he "wept" during his interviews with law enforcement. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.35-36.) According to Carver, the district court "appears to 
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have confused the concept of 'displaying emotion' with 'expressing remorse for 
criminal conduct"' and, he asserts, "the district court's requirement that [he] 
express remorse ... would require him to stop maintaining his innocence." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.36.) All of Carver's arguments on this point lack merit. 
Carver's suggestion, made for the first time on appeal, that he expresses 
grief in ways other than making a "public spectacle of emotion," is unsupported 
by anything in the record and neither William Shakespeare's nor Voltaire's views 
on grief mean Carver himself feels any sort of empathy or concern for the fact 
that a child died in his care. (Appellant's Brief, p.35.) And, the sad fact that 
D.B.'s mother may have shared some of Carver's behaviors does not make 
either of their actions insignificant. 
Carver's claim that he "wept" due to the emotion he felt about D.B. is also 
disingenuous. While there was undoubtedly testimony that he "cried" when he 
was confronted by law enforcement with the fact that they did not believe his 
story, those officers clarified that they saw no actual tears and the court was 
certainly not required to conclude that any emotion displayed by Carver was 
attributable to grief over D.B. as opposed to emotion related to the fact that he 
was a suspect in D.B.'s death and was going to have his parole revoked. (Tr., 
Vol. 2, p.287, L.14 - p.288, L.2; Vol. 3, p.665, L.16 - p.666, L.9.) Finally, the 
record clearly reflects the district court was not "confused" on this issue; the court 
specifically noted that it was not a mutually exclusive proposition to maintain 
innocence or show concern for the loss of life. (R., p.155.) Carver's claim 
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otherwise represents another disingenuous assertion in support of his sentencing 
argument. 
The district court considered the information presented to it and imposed a 
reasonable sentence. Carver has failed to show otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Carver's judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 28th day of December 2012. 
JESSI AM. LORELLO 
Def ut Attorney General 
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